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By P. O. Ome
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Date 21/1/71

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NEAR EASTERN

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368

FILE No. NEJ 3/408/1 (Part (1-29))

TITLE: ATTITUDE OF ISRAEL TO THE
HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

REFER TO

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NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
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1970

USEFUL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTENTS OF THIS FILE

COMP REF.

SUPPORT OF ISRAEL FOR MAINTENANCE OF HASHEMITE
REGIME IN KINGDOM OF JORDAN

TRANSFERS

(13) TO NET 1/4

LAST FILE: ~~NET 3/408/1~~ (NET 3/408/1) (1968-9)


NEXT FILE: NET 3/408/1 (1971)

OTHER RELATED FILES: _____



Mr. L. S. 2/3
Mr. Markis } to see. ①
RSM 3/iii By The British
Amman 2/3

UNCLASSIFIED



BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV.

24 February, 1970.

Dear Christopher,
Israel/Jordan

Mr. Israel Galili, Minister without Portfolio, (with responsibilities for Information) was reported in the Government Press Bulletin as having said to the Tel Aviv Press Club on 20 February that, despite the Israelis disappointment with Jordan since the Six Day War, Israel had been acting with the utmost restraint. This was on the assumption that as long as Jordan existed in her own right, they should not despair of the possibility of a settlement.

(Reported
in
Birkm
plan.)

2. Mr. Galili stressed that Israel did not want to see the Hashemite Kingdom eliminated, but she could not remain neutral if foreign forces obtained power over Jordan with all that that implied. Jordan would then be liable to become a centre for political and military intrigue, and could serve as a stronghold for Moscow's efforts to increase Soviet power and strengthen Soviet status in the region.

Yours ever
Peter

(P. Gregory-Hood)

A.C.D.S. MacRae, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc: Chancery,
Amman.

RESTRICTED



Mr. MacRae
Mr. Evans
23/ii

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No. TO
27 FEB 1970
NE 11/16

M. Evans

BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV.

Pan 2, as a
cannet, almost defies
belief.

GM Makin 23/ii

19 February, 1970.

Mr. Topher,
Israel/Jordan

At a United Jewish Appeal fund-raising dinner on 18 February in Tel Aviv the Minister of Transport said that there was a strong possibility that Yasser Arafat would take over in Jordan from King Hussein. If this happened, the Israel army was ready to take whatever action was necessary.

2. Weizman also said "we must be suffering from psychosis to think that we have to give back territory."

!!! Weizman is, as you know, very hawkish and is not necessarily representative of Israeli thinking.

Yas ever
Pete G, Hood.
(P. Gregory-Hood)

A.C.D.S. MacRae, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc: Chancery,
Amman.

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO FOH 201100Z

TO MOD DI4

APRIL 1970

TOP COPY

3

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 FOH 201100Z APRIL REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO MOD MO2, JIS(NE), JIS GULF, FCO, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
JERUSALEM, DA TEL AVIV, DA BEIRUT, DA CAIRO.

FROM DA AMMAN

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
21 APR 1970

NEJ3/408/1

JORDAN ARMY SPOKESMAN STATES:

(A) AT 172000Z ISRAELIS OPENED FIRE WITH 81 MM MORTARS AND
MEDIUM ARTY FROM THEIR POSITIONS ON MUSA ALAMI'S FARM ON TO
JORDANIAN POSITIONS. JORDANIANS RETURNED FIRE AND EXCHANGE
LASTED FOR TWENTY MINUTES, NO JORDANIAN CASUALTIES.

(B) AT 181950Z ISRAELIS OPENED FIRE FROM 105 MM HOWS ON
JORDANIAN FORCES IN THE AREA OF WAQQAS YB 4403. JORDANIAN FORCES
RETURNED FIRE AND EXCHANGE LASTED FOR FIVE MINUTES. NO JORDANIAN
CASUALTIES.

(C) AT 182045Z ISRAELIS SHELLLED THE TEL AL SUKR AREA YA4197.
JORDANIAN FORCES RETRURNED FIRE AND EXCHANGE LASTED FOR FIVE
MINUTES. NO JORDANIAN CASUALTIES. ONE ISRAELI GUN POSITION WAS
SILENCED.

(D) AT 190640Z ISRAELIS OPENED FIRE FROM MMG ON JORDANIAN
FORCES IN THE AREA OF SUWEIMA YA 4519. JORDANIANS RETURNED
FIRE AND EXCHANGE LASTED FOR TEN MINUTES. NO JORDANIAN CASUALTIES.

(E) AT 192120Z AN ISRAELI PATROL CROSSED THE CEASE-FIRE
LINE IN THE SAFI AREA AND CLASHED WITH JORDANIAN FORCES FOR
TWENTYFIVE MINUTES. ONE JORDANIAN SOLDIER WAS WOUNDED.
FCO PASS PRIORITY TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

SIR P ADAMS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/PASSED TO M.O.D./

FILES

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARABIAN DEPT.

U.N. DEPT.

NNNNN

DEFENCE DEPT.

P.U.S.D.

NEWS DEPT.

DIS MOD

OFFICE OF THE

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA,
CANADA HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.



HAUT-COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA,
MAISON DU CANADA,
LONDRES, S-O.1.

this is interesting *29/4*

④

Mr. Murphy from 29. iv

Mr. Evans R.E. 6/5.

CONFIDENTIAL

April 28, 1970.

Mr. Makins Com 7/5

Mrs. Berkett

187/5

Don't know

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 8 MAY 1970
NEJ 3/408/1

pr
am
15/5

... You may be interested in seeing the attached
copy of Beirut's letter No. 178 of March 20 on Israeli
Policy Toward Jordan.

John
Paul

David M. Miller
Counsellor

Mr. Chris Long,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Downing Street (West),
London S.W.1.

cc Chin Hong.
New London Dept.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
A The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs, Ottawa

FROM
De The Canadian Embassy, BEIRUT

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet Israeli Policy Toward Jordan

SECURITY
Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL
DATE March 20, 1970
NUMBER
Numéro 178

FILE	DOSSIER
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MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

Recently a number of reports have indicated several Israeli spokesmen believe their country has a political interest in the maintenance of the Hashemite regime and in consequence has been behaving with some measure of restraint toward Jordan. On the basis of our visit to Jordan last week there is little evidence Israel follows a policy remotely resembling that implied by these sources.

2. From the perspective of this mission a definition of Israel's interest in Jordan would appear to be entirely dependent on the Israeli view of the future of the conflict. If a settlement is still feasible, Israel would seem to have a direct stake in the maintenance of Hussein. If, however, the Israelis believe that continued conflict is inevitable they would seem to have an equally clear interest in convincing the United States they are the Americans' only "friends" in the region. In this latter context the current Jordanian and Lebanese regimes might well appear to be obstacles to an entirely beneficial polarization.

3. Our own impression of the Israelis' behaviour is that their actions are determined almost exclusively by their self-defined security needs and that the political consequences of these acts are of little moment to them. We believe evidence can be adduced from an examination of Israel's apparent military policy toward Jordan.

4. It is evident that at least some of Israel's military activity east of the cease-fire line is aimed less at carrying the fight against the fedayin across the line than at punishing the Jordanians for not taking steps to control the infiltrators. This is not to say the latter type of operations is necessarily unjustified; we appreciate the weight of the argument that the Arab states cannot expect to be treated as inviolable because they are too weak to control the fedayin. Conversely, however, Israel can hardly claim to be solicitous of the well-being of Hussein when it attempts to force the Jordanians into a course of action which would almost certainly have severe internal repercussions. In the course of the past ten months the East Ghor canal has been breached three times. In each instance, the Israeli objective was clearly political and only indirectly military.

5. In addition, the Israeli definition of what constitutes a "military target" for their manifestly superior armed forces appears to be extremely flexible. A reliable source told us that for two weeks between December 15 and January 1 the Israelis used their long-range artillery to shell the city of Irbid almost daily. According to our source, who waxed indignant in recounting the event, the shelling was directly against the city itself. Although the people of Irbid were probably as pro-fedayin as other Jordanians there was no question of commando bases being hit; it was simply a terrorist act perhaps designed to weaken Hussein's position. He went on to indicate that the fedayin have no monopoly on indiscriminant mine laying; similar operations have been recently carried out in East Jordan by Israeli patrols. Similarly, instances of the slaughter of livestock by Israeli forces were not unknown. Our source indicated these acts may not have had official sanction. The Israeli forces however were no freer of thugs than the armies of other nations.

6. Moreover, although the Israelis have not, to our knowledge, mounted anything in Jordan similar to their "anti-Nasser campaign," they show no particular restraint concerning the methods employed in the operations they do carry out. Our informant told us he was astonished at how many people continued to believe the IAF does not use napalm. He indicated that at least in Jordan napalm had long served the Israelis as an ordinary instrument of war. True.

7. It might also be noted that the Israeli statement issued during the Jordanian/fedayin crisis in February is susceptible to several interpretations. It is possible that the statement had been designed to embarrass Hussein rather than to assist him.

8. In consequence, as seen from Amman, there is little to suggest that the Israelis attach any special importance to the maintenance of Hussein. If they do, they clearly do not let it interfere with their direct and indirect attempts to control the fedayin. All that can be seen from the Jordanian capital is the evidence of a dirty little war. | ✓

The Embassy.

S E C R E T

CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NO 530

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
5 JUNE 1970

S E C R E T

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8/6

TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 530 OF 5 JUNE 1970 -REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, MOSCOW, PARIS,
NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 5 JUN 1970
NEJ3/408/1

ISRAEL/JORDAN.

WHEN I SAW ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY EVENING,
HE STARTED BY SAYING THAT, SHORTLY AFTER THE SHELLING OF
TIBERIAS ON JUNE 3, KING HUSSEIN HAD APPROACHED THE ISRAELIS
THROUGH THE US EMBASSY TO SUGGEST THAT IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD
GIVE HIM A BREATHING SPACE WITHOUT RETALIATION HE WOULD TAKE
STRONG MEASURES AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN. ACCORDING TO MR EBAN
THE KING'S LANGUAGE ABOUT THE FEDAYEEN HAD BEEN EXTREMELY
STRONG. AFTER A SERIES OF EXCHANGES THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED
TO GIVE HIM THE BREATHING SPACE HE WANTED.

2. IN OUR SUBSEQUENT TALK IT TRANSPIRED THAT THE KING'S
UNDERTAKING AMOUNTED TO SAYING THAT, IF THE FEDAYEEN ESTABLISHED
THEMSELVES IN POSITIONS FROM WHICH THEY COULD SHOOT KATYUSHAS
AT EILAT, THE DEAD SEA WORKS OR BEIT SHEAN, THE JORDANIAN
ARMY WOULD TAKE STEPS TO STOP THEM, INCLUDING FIRING ON THEM
IF NECESSARY. MR EBAN IMPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO UNDERTAKING
AS REGARDS FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES ELSEWHERE, E.G. IN AMMAN.

3. HE SAID THAT, LIKE THE ISRAELIS, THE KING HAD RECOGNISED
THAT THERE WAS A CYCLE OF VIOLENCE, WHICH MUST BE STOPPED
SOMEWHERE. TIBERIAS HAD BEEN A RETALIATION FOR IRBID, BUT
THAT IN TURN HAD BEEN A RETALIATION FOR BEIT SHEAN. THIS
WAS A NEW CYCLE STARTED BY THE FEDAYEEN, AFTER A QUIET PERIOD.
WHEN I ASKED ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE IRAQIS, MR EBAN AFFIRMED
THAT ALTHOUGH IRAQI GUNS HAD FIRED ON TIBERIAS THIS HAD BEEN
AT JORDANIAN WISHES.

4. MR. EBAN

S E C R E T

4. MR EBAN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO TIME LIMIT. IF THERE WERE NO FURTHER ATTACKS THE BREATHING SPACE COULD BE PROLONGED INDEFINITELY. THE JORDANIAN MEASURES MIGHT NOT BE 100% EFFECTIVE AND THERE MIGHT BE THE OCCASIONAL KATYUSHA ROCKET FIRED. BUT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO SEE IF THE KING COULD MAKE HIS INTENTIONS EFFECTIVE.

5. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE KING HAD MADE SIMILAR PROTESTATIONS IN THE PAST ABOUT CONTROLLING THE FEDAYEEN, BUT MR EBAN THOUGHT THAT THE STRENGTH OF HIS LANGUAGE ON THIS OCCASION JUSTIFIED THE ISRAELIS IN GIVING HIM HIS BREATHING SPACE.

6. I SAID, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, THAT THIS SEEMED TO ME A STATESMANLIKE DECISION. I WAS SURE THAT YOU WOULD ALSO WELCOME IT AND HOPE THAT IT WOULD PROVE SUCCESSFUL IN STOPPING THE RISING CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WHICH WE ALL SO MUCH DEPLORED. MR EBAN MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF WE FELT ABLE TO DO ANYTHING TO HELP MAKE THE NEW ARRANGEMENT LAST, THIS WOULD BE WELCOME TO ISRAEL. HE ASKED THAT WE SHOULD TREAT THE INFORMATION HE HAD GIVEN ME AS VERY CONFIDENTIAL.

7. WE HAVE HAD A SIMILAR ACCOUNT IN STRICT CONFIDENCE FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME POINTS WHICH ARE STILL A BIT PUZZLING, THE IMPORTANT THING SEEMS TO BE THE END RESULT.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS, UKNIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.
MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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P.S. TO C.D.L.
P.S. TO MR. DUARD
SIR E. PECK
MR. HAYIAN

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S E C R E T

TOP COPY

6

CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 225

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
5 JUNE 1970

SECRET

Pr
8/6

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 225 DATED 5 JUNE REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION PRIORITY TO TEL AVIV CAIRO PARIS UKMIS
AND WASHINGTON.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 5 JUN 1970 NE J3/408/1

1 f 6
TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 530: ISRAEL/JORDAN

I CAN WELL BELIEVE THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS GIVEN SOME
SUCH UNDERTAKING, BECAUSE AS MY DA HAS BEEN REPORTING FOR THE
PAST FEW WEEKS, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE JORDAN ARMY IS NOW
PATROLLING RIGHT FORWARD TO THE RIVER IN THE NORTH JORDAN VALLEY,
I.E. IN THAT PART OF THE FRONT FACING ISRAEL PROPER. IT HAS IN
FACT BEEN SUGGESTED THAT THE KING CAME TO AN INFORMAL AGREEMENT
WITH ARAFAT THAT THE JORDAN ARMY WOULD GIVE THE FEDAYEEN FULL
CO-OPERATION IN THE SOUTH JORDAN VALLEY IN RETURN FOR THEIR LAYING
OFF SENSITIVE AREAS LIKE THE BEISAN VALLEY.

2. THIS, OF COURSE, IS AN EXTENSION OF THE KING'S POLICY
OF KEEPING THE FEDAYEEN AWAY FROM AQABA/EILAT AND FROM THE SODOM
POTASH WORKS, FOR WHICH PURPOSE THE JORDAN ARMY OCCUPIED THE
GHOR SAFI REGION A COUPLE OF MONTHS AGO.

3. AS I REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT, ISRAELI REPRISALS HAVE
SERVED SIMPLY TO STRENGTHEN SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN EXTREMISTS
AT THE EXPENSE OF THE KING. FOR THIS REASON, AND FOR THE GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS GIVEN IN PARA 6 OF THE TEL AVIV TELEGRAM I WELCOME
SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, SUBJECT TO TWO POINTS:-

/(A) THAT THE

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

-2-

(A) THAT THE ISRAELIS BEAR IN MIND. (AS INDEED MR EBAN SEEMS TO HAVE CONCEDED) THE DANGERS OF EXPECTING TOO MUCH OF THE KING . HIS POSITION IN JORDAN IS SUCH THAT SIMPLY MUST LET THE FEDAYEEN BLOW OFF STEAM SOMEWHERE. CUPRENT JORDANIAN POLICY IS EXPLAINED IN MY DA'S FORTNIGHTLY REPORT NO 12/73 (COPY TO TRIPP IN TODAY'S BAG). MOREOVER, A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE JUNIOR RANKS, POSSIBLY A MAJORITY, ARE PALASTINIANS WHO ARE DOUBTLESS RELUCTANT TO SHOOT UP FEDAYEEN WHO MAY WELL BE THEIR OWN RELATIVES. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE MORE CLOSELY THE ISRAELIS CAN DEFINE WHAT ARE THEIR "VITAL POINTS" THE MORE EASY WILL IT BE FOR THE JORDAN ARMY TO PATROL EFFECTIVELY THE AREAS WITHIN ROCKET RANGE OF THESE POINTS.

(B) THAT THE ISRAELIS BEND THEIR MINDS URGENTLY TO DEVISING SOME MORE POSITIVE INDUCEMENT TO STRENGTHEN THE KING'S HAND RATHER THAN THE NEGATIVE ONE OF STEPPING DOWN THEIR ATTACKS ON JORDANIAN CIVILIANS.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]


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P.S. TO C.D.L.
P.S. TO MR. LUARD
SER E. PECK.
MR. HAYMAN

S E C R E T

DDDD

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



⑤
Distr.
GENERAL

S/9820
3 June 1970

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH



M. A. G. un
9/6

pr un
12/6

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1970 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN TO
THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to my letter of today concerning continued Israeli acts of aggression against Jordan villages and towns in the northern part of the country, I regret to bring to Your Excellency's attention the following:

At 14.55 hours local time Israeli bombers resumed the strafing and bombing of the villages of Um Qays, Beit Eides, Almansoura and the main road connecting the villages of Shuna-Shamaliyyah and Kureimah, using rockets and heavy bombs.

At 16.00 hours local time the Israeli occupying forces shelled the town of Irbid and its suburbs from the occupied Syrian heights, using heavy artillery. The Israeli shelling continued intermittently until 18.00 hours local time.

As a result of Israel's shelling and according to preliminary reports, seven civilians were killed and thirty-three others wounded, some of them seriously. Four civilian cars were destroyed and eight houses damaged. The Jordanian forces returned the shelling against the sources of the fire in Tiberias and other military positions in the area.

These acts of aggression, which left scores of innocent civilian victims, are but a new series of continuing Israeli aggression perpetrated against Jordan and thus creating a grave situation increasing tension in the area and causing a serious threat to international peace and security.


Israel and its leadership bears a heavy responsibility for such murderous and planned attacks against children, women and civilians. Israel is bent on escalating such a campaign of terror. It becomes a world moral duty and a collective responsibility to stop such campaigns and to bring a halt to continued Israeli aggression.

S/9820
English
Page 2

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



JOP COPY (8)

CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 291

SECRET

TO TEL AVIV
12 JUNE 1970

pr
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2/7

SECRET.

JORDAN SITUATION.

PLEASE TELEGRAPH BY 12 NOON 12 JUNE:

(A) YOUR VIEW ON THE ISRAELI ASSESSMENT OF AND REACTION TO
PRESENT SITUATION IN JORDAN:

(B) LIKELY ISRAELI REACTION TO A SITUATION IN WHICH JORDAN
WAS "CARVED UP" BETWEEN IRAQ/SYRIA (AND POSSIBLY SAUDI
ARABIA).

STEWART

LAST	
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PERSONNEL SERVICES D.

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now see f(9).

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 557

12 JUNE 1970

Pam
16/6

TIME FACTOR 1100 G.M.T.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
12 JUN 1970

NE JB 1408/1

f ⑧ — YOUR TEL NO 291: JORDAN.

OUR PRESENT INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN WATCHING THE SITUATION CLOSELY AND WE KNOW THAT THEY HAVE LET THE KING OF JORDAN KNOW THAT IF HE WANTS TO WITHDRAW FORCES, PARTICULARLY TANKS, FROM THE FRONT HE CAN DO SO WITH IMPUNITY AS FAR AS THEY ARE CONCERNED. WE HAVE NO REPORTS OF INCIDENTS ON THE JORDAN BORDER IN THE PAST DAY OR TWO. YESTERDAY, THE ISRAELIS WERE TAKING THE LINE THAT THE KING HAD THE STRENGTH TO WIN IF HE WANTED TO USE IT. BUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS CAST DOUBT ON THIS.

2. THERE SEEM TO BE FOUR POSSIBLE OUTCOMES:

- (A) THE KING FORCES A SHOWDOWN AND COMES OUT ON TOP
- (B) THE KING FALLS AND THE FEDAYEEN TAKE OVER
- (C) A COMPROMISE
- (D) CHAOS.

3. THE BASIC ISRAELI NEEDS SEEM TO BE THAT

- (I) THEY SHOULD HAVE A BORDER WHICH IS AS DEFENSIBLE AS POSSIBLE AND PRESENTS THE MINIMUM THREAT TO THEIR OWN POPULATION
- (II) SUBJECT TO THESE POINTS, THEY SHOULD INCUR THE LEAST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ODIUM AND ECONOMISE WHERE THEY CAN IN MANPOWER AND RESOURCES.
- (III) THEY SHOULD IF POSSIBLE HAVE SOME (FOLLOWING TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) INTERLOCUTEUR VALABLE ON THE OTHER SIDE, WITH WHOM THEY CAN DEAL, IF ONLY ON THE SAME SHAKY BASIS AS IN THE PAST.

NAME	
REL	
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4. OF THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES, (A) NOW LOOKS UNLIKELY. BY SACKING HIS COMMANDERS (AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 261) THE KING ALREADY SEEMS TO BE MANOEUVRING FOR A COMPROMISE. BUT IF THIS WERE A FEINT AND HE DID WIN IN THE END, THE ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THIS AS THE BEST ANSWER AND THINGS WOULD GO ON MUCH AS BEFORE.

5. IF THERE WERE A COMPROMISE ALL WOULD DEPEND ON ITS NATURE. IF IT SAVED THE KING'S FACE, PRESUMABLY WE SHOULD LURCH ON TO THE NEXT CRISIS, WITH THE ISRAELIS TRYING TO CAJOLE AND THREATEN THE KING INTO RE-ESTABLISHING HIS AUTHORITY. BUT IF THE COMPROMISE AMOUNTED TO GIVING THE FEDAYEEN A FREE HAND ON THE BORDERS OR PARTS OF THEM, THE ISRAELIS MIGHT WELL STEP UP MILITARY ACTIVITY AGAINST THE AREAS CONCERNED.

6. ONE COURSE OPEN TO THEM WOULD BE TO SEIZE THE HIGH GROUND EAST OF THE RIVER JORDAN, FROM WHICH MOST OF THE ROCKET ATTACKS COME, AND HOLD IT AT LEAST TEMPORARILY. THE MOST IMPORTANT GROUND IN THIS CONTEXT IS OF COURSE THAT FACING THE KIBBUTZIM IN THE BEIT SHEAN VALLEY. BECAUSE THIS WOULD STRETCH THEIR RESOURCES AND MEAN GIVING UP THE PRESENT FRONTIER BASED ON A CLEAR NATURAL FEATURE, AND BECAUSE IT WOULD CAUSE AN INTERNATIONAL RUMPUS, THEY WOULD ONLY BE LIKELY TO DO IT IF IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE THREAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE UNACCEPTABLY INCREASED BY A BREAKDOWN IN CONTROL OVER THE FEDAYEEN'S ACTIVITIES. AT THE SAME TIME, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF STABILITY, THIS MIGHT BE NO BAD THING, AT ANY RATE FOR THE TIME BEING.

7. IF (B) HAPPENED, THE CHOICES WOULD BE HARDER AND THE PRESSURES FOR ACTION STRONGER. AGAIN MUCH DEPENDS ON THE NATURE OF THE NEW POWER STRUCTURE IN JORDAN. ALTHOUGH IN THE LONG RUN THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE WISE TO ACCEPT AN ARAFAT REGIME, AND A PALESTINIAN ENTITY, THEY MAY NOT ALL SEE IT THIS WAY. NOR PRESUMABLY CAN ANYTHING AS TIDY AS AN ARAFAT REGIME BE ASSUMED. THERE MAY BE VOICES RAISED HERE FOR THE SEIZURE OF AMMAN, BUT THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR OPERATION, MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY, AND SEEMS UNLIKELY, AS IT WOULD NOT SERVE THEIR NEEDS AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE. IN THE CASE OF (B), HOWEVER, THE TEMPTATION TO SEIZE THE HIGH GROUND WOULD BE STRONGER.

8. IF CHAOS SUPERVENES, THIS IS WHERE THE CARVE-UP MAY COME IN. THE ISRAELIS WOULD CERTAINLY MUCH DISLIKE AN ACCRETION OF NEITHER IRAQI OR SYRIAN STRENGTH ON THEIR BORDERS.

/THEY

THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN CRITICAL OF SAUDI FORCES IN JORDAN. NOR IS IT CLEAR WHAT NASSER MEANS BY SAYING THAT EGYPT CANNOT STAND IDLY BY, WHILE THE EASTERN COMMAND BREAKS UP. THEY MIGHT WELL CONSIDER TRYING TO WARN THE SYRIANS OFF, E.G. BY THREATS AGAINST DAMASCUS, BUT IT IS HARDER TO SEE WHAT CREDIBLE THREAT COULD BE MADE AGAINST IRAQ OR SAUDI ARABIA, AND INDEED THEY MIGHT BE LESS HOSTILE TO SAUDI PARTICIPATION. IF IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THERE WAS TO BE A CARVE-UP BY HOSTILE REGIMES, THEIR SECURITY MIGHT WELL REQUIRE THEM TO MOVE FORWARD. THIS AGAIN WOULD PRIMARILY INVOLVE THE HIGH GROUND THREATENING ISRAELI TERRITORY AND SETTLEMENTS AND I DOUBT IF THEY WOULD WANT TO UNDERTAKE ANY WIDER OCCUPATION OF JORDAN TERRITORY, WHICH COULD STRAIN THEIR MANPOWER RESOURCES.

9. A BIG QUESTION WOULD BE THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE. IF THE RUSSIANS GAVE MORE VISIBLE SUPPORT TO A FEDAYEEN REGIME OR TO A TAKEOVER BY OTHER ARABS, THIS SHOULD INDUCE CAUTION IN THE ISRAELIS. BUT HERE AGAIN THEY MIGHT THINK SOME LIMITED PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION DESIRABLE.

10. AS YOU SEE, THIS IS LARGELY GUESSWORK AND THE IMponderABLES ARE ALMOST INFINITE. I AM GOING TO JERUSALEM THIS MORNING AND WILL TELEGRAPH AGAIN IF MY TALKS THERE THROW ANY FURTHER LIGHT.

11. MAY I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO REPEAT IF NECESSARY ?

MR. BARNES

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
N.E.D.
PERS SVS DEPT

COPY TO:

MR. A.S. FAIR, ODM, ELAND HOUSE
MR. J. ASHWOOD, CRED

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now see f(10).

MEIR/CAT.A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NO 560

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL.

12 JUNE 1970
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
15 JUN 1970
NE JB/408/1

TOP COPY

pr
16/6

f ⑨ MY TELEGRAM NO 557: JORDAN.

I CALLED ON LOURIE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING. BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED HE HAD HEARD THAT THE HOSTAGES HAD BEEN RELEASED AND WAS TAKING THE LINE THAT THE KING, THOUGH BATTERED, HAD PRESERVED HIS POSITION BY A COMPROMISE, AND IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHAT THE OUTCOME WOULD BE. IF IT MEANT, AS IT WELL MIGHT, THAT THE FEDAYEEN WOULD RENEW THEIR ATTACKS ON ISRAEL TERRITORY, THIS WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE A SERIOUS MATTER FOR ISRAEL, WHO WOULD BE BOUND TO REACT, BUT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO SAY WHAT SHE WOULD DO ABOUT IT. HE AGREED THAT FROM THE ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW IT WAS BETTER THAT THE KING SHOULD REMAIN, ALTHOUGH HE POINTED OUT THAT SOME PEOPLE HERE WERE SAYING THAT THIS WAS NOT IMPORTANT AND THAT IF THE FEDAYEEN TOOK OVER THE SITUATION WOULD BE CLARIFIED, NOT SO MUCH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF HAVING SOMEONE TO DEAL WITH, AS BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS WOULD KNOW THAT THEY WERE FACING A HOSTILE REGIME IN CONTROL OF THE WHOLE OF JORDAN.

2. IN THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES HE DID NOT EXPECT OTHER ARAB STATES TO INTERVENE, ALTHOUGH HE AGREED THAT THE ARRIVAL OF SYRIA AND IRAQ ON ISRAEL'S BORDERS WOULD BE THE WORST POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD NO INFORMATION OF THE RUSSIANS HAVING PLAYED ANY PART IN JORDAN AFFAIRS OF LATE, OTHER THAN TO OFFER ARMS.

3. LOURIE SAID THAT MRS MEIR HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT NO PUBLIC COMMENT WAS TO BE MADE, AND THE NEWSPAPERS HAD INDEED CARRIED VERY LITTLE. IT SEEMS THAT WHEN GENERAL WEIZMAN STARTED TO COMMENT ON TELEVISION LAST NIGHT HE WAS FADED OUT. LOURIE ALSO SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN ACTION AS WELL AS IN SPEECH.

4. DESPITE THIS BLAND AND RATHER UNCOMMUNICATIVE RESPONSE, I HAVE THE IMPRESSION, FROM WHAT WE HAVE HEARD OF ONE OR TWO PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS, THAT SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING MAY BE

/GOING ON

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

GOING ON, AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE COMPROMISE DOES NOT HOLD. IN THIS CONNEXION THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE HAVE TOLD THE MILITARY ATTACHE THAT THEY REGARD THE DENOUEMENT AS TOTAL CAPITULATION BY THE KING, AND HIS SACRIFICE OF THE TWO COMMANDERS HAS OBVIOUSLY WEAKENED THEIR EARLIER BELIEF THAT HE COULD WIN A SHOWDOWN IF HE WISHED. THEY ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ON THE FEDAYEEN SIDE HABBASH HAS BEEN MAKING ALL THE RUNNING AT THE EXPENSE OF ARAFAT WHO, AS LOURIE ALSO SAID TO ME, HAD WANTED TO CALM THINGS DOWN.

MR. BARNES

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MR. A.S. FAIR, O.D.M., ELAND HOUSE.

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15 JUN 1970
NET 3/408/1

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CYPHER CAT A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NO 562

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
12 JUNE 1970

Pr
16/6

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 562 OF 12 JUNE 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

NET 4/1 f26 f10

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 289.

SINCE IT WAS EVIDENT FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH LOURIE
THIS MORNING (MY TELEGRAM NO 560 NOT TO ALL) AND INDEED FROM
ISRAELI ACTIONS THAT THEY HAVE THE POINT VERY MUCH IN MIND,
I HAVE NOT ACTED ON THE DISCRETION GIVEN ME, ALTHOUGH IT WILL
HAVE BEEN CLEAR TO LOURIE THAT WE WELCOMED THE RESTRAINT
WHICH WAS BEING SHOWN.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO WASHINGTON (ROUTINE).

MR. BARNES.

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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ARABIAN DEPT.

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CIPHER CAT.A.

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 289

TO TEL AVIV
11 JUNE 1970
(NED)

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2/16

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 289 OF 11 JUNE REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, CAIRO, WASHINGTON.

12/15

NEJ114 . (36)

AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 248 (WHICH WE ARE REPEATING TO WASHINGTON).
JORDAN INTERNAL SITUATION.


YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO TELL THE ISRAELIS THAT WE HOPE THAT, IN
HIS PRESENT VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION, KING HUSSEIN CAN RELY ON
THE ISRAELIS TAKING NO ACTION WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO HIS
DIFFICULTIES DURING THE PRESENT CRISIS.

2. HM EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON SHOULD INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT
OF ANY ACTION YOU DECIDE TO TAKE.

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARABIAN D.



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
FM CLAIR
SECURITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 989

TOP COPY 14
TO F.C.O.
18 NOVEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

181005Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 989 DATED 18 NOVEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW
UKMIS NEW YORK.



JORDAN-ISRAEL.

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am
19/11

JORDAN NEWS AGENCY YESTERDAY CARRIED A STATEMENT BY KING HUSSEIN ON RECENT REPORTS THAT ISRAEL WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH JORDAN THROUGH DR. JARRING WITHOUT THE U.A.R. HE SAID THAT ANY TALKS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242 MUST TAKE PLACE UNDER U.N. AUSPICES, AND MUST BE "BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES ONLY VIZ. THE ARAB PARTY AS A WHOLE AND THE OTHER PARTY" PEACE REQUIRED ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, AND THE RECOVERY BY THE PALESTINIAN ARAB PEOPLE OF ITS FULL RIGHTS IN ITS HOMELAND.

2. IN A SEPARATE JNA STATEMENT, AN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT A RECENT REPORT IN TIME MAGAZINE THAT MEETINGS HAD TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND CERTAIN ISRAELI OFFICIALS WAS COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

SEE M.I.F.T.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON PARIS AND NEW YORK

MR PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER CAT/A
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 910

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TO F.C.O.
18 NOVEMBER 1970

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181011Z

NETS/408/1

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 910 DATED 18 NOVEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV BEIRUT CAIRO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW
AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

M.I.P.T.

JORDAN-ISRAEL.

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19/11

IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHETHER ISRAEL IS GIVING CURRENCY TO ALLEGATIONS OF SECRET MEETINGS WITH THE JORDANIANS.

2. SHE HAS OF COURSE MADE PUBLIC ALLEGATIONS OF THIS SORT FROM TIME TO TIME IN THE PAST, BUT THESE HAVE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION HERE OF BEING PROPAGANDA EXERCISES WITH ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:-

- (A) TO LEND SUPPORT TO THE ASSERTION THAT ISRAEL COULD COME TO TERMS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS IF ONLY THE BIG FOUR DID NOT INTERFERE
- (B) TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE U.A.R.
- (C) TO SCARE KING HUSSEIN OFF FROM TAKING ANY SUCH INITIATIVE.

3. WHILE WE HAVE REPORTED THAT SOME OF KING HUSSEIN'S ADVISERS BELIEVE HE IS WILLING TO TAKE SOUNDINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS, OUR GUESS IS THAT SUCH SOUNDINGS WOULD ONLY COME OFF IF THEIR SECRECY WERE GUARANTEED, AT ANY RATE UNTIL THEY LOOKED LIKE BEING SUCCESSFUL. KING HUSSEIN WOULD CERTAINLY NOT RISK FURTHER ALIENATING THE U.A.R. AND INCURRING AN APPEASER'S ODIUM, IF AT THE END OF THE DAY, ISRAELI TERMS WERE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE. CERTAINLY, IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT HE SHOULD DENY ANY INTENTION OF GOING IT ALONE UNDER JARRING'S PUBLIC AUSPICES.

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/ 4. BUT THEN

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- 2 -

4. BUT THEN PERHAPS MRS. MEIR'S OFFER (TEL AVIV TEL NO 1040) WAS NO MORE THAN A RIPOSTE TO THE UAR JIBE IN THE UN THAT HAD ISRAEL BEEN GENUINE IN HER ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROGERS PLAN, SHE WOULD AT LEAST BE NEGOTIATING THROUGH JARRING WITH JORDAN. INDEED, THE AMERICANS MAY HAVE BEEN PRODDING HER THEMSELVES ON THESE LINES.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MR PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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CYPHER CAT 'A'

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1050

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

19 NOVEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

191230Z

ADDRESSED FCO TEL NO 1050 OF 19 NOVEMBER RPTD FOR INFO
TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, UK MIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS
AND MOSCOW.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 536: ISRAEL/JORDAN MEETINGSRECEIVED IN
NETJ 3/408/1

AS YOU KNOW THIS FIRST CAME TO LIGHT WITH TIME MAGAZINE
FOR NOVEMBER 23, AND THE STORY BROKE HERE ON NOVEMBER 16.

2. IT THEN BECAME KNOWN THAT A QUESTION PUT DOWN IN THE
KNESSET LAST WEEK HAD BEEN EXPUNGED FROM THE RECORD. PRESS
CORRESPONDENTS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE CENSORS WERE BUSY AND
THE STORY COULD ONLY BE TOLD HERE WHEN IT COULD BE REPRODUCED
FROM REPORTS ABROAD.

3. AS FAR AS THE FACTS GO, WE HAVE ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT
SECRET MEETINGS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE KING OF JORDAN
HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE FROM TIME TO TIME. I HAVE HEARD MR.
EBAN, WHEN ASKED ABOUT THEM, START BY SAYING THAT HE DENIED
THEIR EXISTENCE AND THEN GO ON IN EFFECT TO DISCUSS THEIR
SUBSTANCE. IN THE PAST WE HAVE HEARD STORIES OF MEETINGS IN
LONDON, GENEVA AND AQABA. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO SECURE SPECIFIC
CORROBORATION, ALTHOUGH WE SHALL TRY TO DO SO, THAT A MEETING
TOOK PLACE THREE WEEKS OR SO AGO BETWEEN ALLON AND THE
KING IN THE ARAVA, OR OF WHAT PASSED BETWEEN THEM. ALLON'S
OFFICE DENIED ON NOVEMBER 16 THAT THERE WAS ANY TRUTH IN
THE PRESS REPORTS.

4. THE STORIES HAVE NATURALLY CAUSED A FLURRY IN THE
PRESS, WITH ACCOUNTS OF ALLON ARRIVING BY AIR AND DRIVING
FOR A MEETING IN AN AIR CONDITIONED CAR, PARTICIPANTS

/SPEAKING

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SPEAKING ARABIC AND ENGLISH AND WEARING DARK GLASSES AND FANCY HATS AND TROOPS IN THE AREA BEING ALERTED. I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT TRUTH THERE IS IN THESE APPARENTLY CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETAILS. IT IS ALSO SAID THAT DAYAN REFUSED TO ATTEND THE MEETINGS BECAUSE HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY GOOD WOULD COME OF THEM.

5. IN THE FACE OF THESE REPORTS, AND APART FROM ALLON'S DENIAL, THE GOVERNMENT HAVE SAID NOTHING, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HEARD FROM A PRESS AGENCY THAT EBAN IS REPORTED TO HAVE ADMITTED, AT A PRIVATE OCCASION IN AMERICA THIS WEEK, THAT MEETINGS TOOK PLACE BETWEEN ALLON AND THE KING AND THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED TO DENY THEM. THIS IS SAID TO HAVE CAUSED A ROW IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES HERE, AND IN GENERAL THE OFFICIAL LINE SEEMS TO BE TO SAY NOTHING. INDEED, WITH REFERENCE TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 910, IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE GIVING CURRENCY TO THE REPORTS AND IN MY VIEW IT IS TOO EARLY TO ATTRIBUTE MOTIVES BEFORE WE KNOW MORE ABOUT THE FACTS.

6. EVEN IF THERE HAS BEEN A RECENT MEETING, IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY ASSUME THE PROPORTION OF A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION WITH JORDAN IN THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT TIME. IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN ONE OF A CONTINUING SERIES. NEVERTHELESS THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE HERE WHO ARE TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION, AND ALLON, AS APPEARED FROM HIS TALK WITH MR. GODBER, IS ONE OF THEM. OTHERS, INCLUDING THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, SEEM SCEPTICAL WHETHER THE KING OF JORDAN COULD STEP OUT OF THE ARAB LINE. TIME MAGAZINE MAY THEREFORE BE RIGHT IN PUTTING THIS AT LEAST PARTLY IN AN INTERNAL POLITICAL CONTEXT, WITH DAYAN TRYING TO EXTRACT KUDOS FROM A DEAL WITH EGYPT AND ALLON AND OTHERS TRYING TO OFFSET THIS BY SETTING SOMETHING IN TRAIN WITH JORDAN.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS UK MIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES:

N.E.D.

NEWS D.

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

SIR P. ADAMS

SIR W. LUCE

CONFIDENTIAL

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RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 536

TO TEL AVIV

18 NOVEMBER 1970

NET 3/508/1
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(NE)

TOP COPY (17)

RESTRICTED. 181625Z.

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 536 OF 18 NOVEMBER AND TO AMMAN REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

MEETING(S) BETWEEN ALLON AND KING HUSSEIN.

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS ALLEGING THAT ONE OR MORE MEETINGS HAVE RECENTLY TAKEN PLACE.

2. AT QUESTION TIME ON 16 NOVEMBER MR. HEALEY ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:

"WHILE STRONGLY WELCOMING THE RIGHT HON. GENTLEMAN'S REASSERTION THAT ISRAEL MUST ENJOY EQUAL SECURITY AFTER A SETTLEMENT TO THAT WHICH SHE ENJOYS TODAY, MAY I ASK WHETHER HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT SUPPORT BILATERAL INITIATIVES TO REACH SETTLEMENTS OF AT LEAST PART OF THE PROBLEM SUCH AS, I ASSUME, WERE ENVISAGED BY THE RECENT MEETING OF THE ISRAELI DEPUTY-PRIME MINISTER WITH KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN?"

I REPLIED:

"I DO NOT KNOW THAT IT IS FOR HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT SUCH APPROACHES AS HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY ISRAEL. I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF WE WAIT TO SEE WHAT COMES OUT OF SUCH CONVERSATIONS BEFORE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT EXPRESS A VIEW."

3. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER THERE IS ANY SUBSTANCE IN THE REPORTS AND FOR ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES:

N.E.D.

NEWS D.

P.S. TO MR. GODBER


SIR P. ADAMS

SIR W. LUCE

RESTRICTED

Private Secretary

c.c. - Mr. Tickell



Middle East

Mr. Watkins.

Eric and X.

R.E. 207/11

I attach notes on:

NES 1/4 — {a} Israel/Jordan;
 {b} Syria; and
 {c} the new cabinet in the U.A.R. — NAV 1/7.

for the Secretary of State to use in Cabinet on 19 November.

R. M. Evans.

(R. M. Evans)
Near Eastern Department
18 November, 1970

CABINET

MIDDLE EAST

19 November, 1970

Speaking Notes

Israel/Jordan

Press reports have alleged that one or more meetings have recently taken place in Israel between King Hussein and Mr. Allon (Deputy Prime Minister). I have asked H.M. Ambassadors at Tel Aviv and Amman for their assessment of whether there is any substance in the reports.

2. The reports are almost certainly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the Israelis have recently indicated that they have been thinking in terms of separate talks with the Jordanians. The Jordanians have frequently expressed their desire for real progress towards a settlement. The possibility that meetings have taken place cannot therefore be ruled out.

Syria

3. On 13 November, the Syrian Minister of Defence, General Hafez Assad, carried out a bloodless coup d'etat. Atassi, the Head of State until then, and prominent members of the left-wing faction of the ruling Ba'ath party have since been exiled. The latest report is that Ahmed Al Khatib (an almost unknown Trade Union leader) has been appointed Head of State with Assad as his Prime Minister.

4. The new régime is not likely to be markedly different from its predecessor in either its internal or external policies. It may work towards making Syria less isolated in the Arab world,

/but it

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but it is unlikely to change either her stance on the Arab/Israel dispute or her attitude of hostility towards the West (we have not had diplomatic relations with Syria since June 1967).

UAR Government Changes

The local press has forecast Government changes in the UAR, but there has not yet been an official announcement. Changes of the kind forecast would represent some devolution of power from the Presidency to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister's preference for leaving detail to others. The main change (although the system has been tried before) would be the appointment of four deputy Prime Ministers (all former Ministers), each with responsibility for co-ordination of the policy of a number of Ministries. Mahmoud Riad would become Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs. Two ministries (Planning and the Treasury) would come under the Prime Minister. One other change of note would be the departure of two of the three secret policemen from the Presidency, where they were Nasser's main instruments of control over the Government.

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 917

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200940Z

TO F.C.O.

20 NOVEMBER 1970

NEJ 3/548/1

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 917 DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION PRIORITY TO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW UKMIS NEW
YORK BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

(17)
YOUR TEL NO 536: [TO TEL AVIV] HUSSEIN/ALLON MEETING(S)

I SHOULD NOT BE AT ALL SURPRISED IF THERE HAD BEEN MEETINGS,
VERY LIKELY BETWEEN ZAID RIFAI AND ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES
(MY LETTER 4/2 OF 13 NOVEMBER TO EVANS IS RELEVANT), BUT I HAVE
NO SOUND EVIDENCE OF KING HUSSEIN'S RECENT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT.

2. AS THE RESULT OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRINCE HASSAN AND A
MEMBER OF MY STAFF WHO RAISED THE SUBJECT WITH HIM ON 19 NOVEMBER
WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN INFORMED ASSURANCE THAT THE KING HIMSELF WILL
TELL US MORE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. PRINCE HASSAN WAS HOWEVER
QUITE NON-COMMITTAL.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON PARIS AND NEW YORK

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

NED

NEWS DEPT

P S TO MR. GODBER

SIR P ADAMS

SIR W LUCE

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YPHER CAT/A
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 927

SECRET - GUARD

TO F.C.O.

23 NOVEMBER 1970

SECRET 231015Z
GUARD.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 927 DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1970, REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK
BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

MY TEL NO 917: ⁽¹⁹⁾ HUSSEIN/ALLON MEETINGS.

A MEMBER OF MY STAFF HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE THIS QUESTION
WITH THE KING DURING AN AUDIENCE ON 22 NOVEMBER. THE FORMER
BROACHED THE SUBJECT BY SAYING THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS TO ESTABLISH
WHETHER THE REPORT OF THE MEETINGS, WHICH APPARENTLY
ORIGINATED IN ISRAEL, MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN INSPIRED BY MRS MEIR'S
SUPPORTERS AS A MEANS OF OUTFLANKING SOME INITIATIVE BY MOSHE DAYAN
AND OTHERS.

2. THE KING AFTER A MOMENTS THOUGHT SAID THAT AS WE WOULD KNOW
HE HAD FOR A LONG TIME HAD SECRET CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELIS.
THIS WAS IMPORTANT FOR TWO REASONS.
FIRST IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO LIMIT THE EXTENT OF CLASHES THAT TOOK
PLACE ALONG THE CEASE FIRE LINE.
SECOND IT WAS IMPORTANT REGULARLY TO CHECK FOR ANY SIGNS OF A LESS
INFLEXIBLE ATTITUDE ON THE ISRAELI PART TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

3. FROM THIS I THINK WE CAN INFER THAT THERE WAS INDEED SOME BASIS
FOR REPORTS OF A MEETING.

KING HUSSEIN IS NOT GIVEN TO TELLING DIRECT LIES AND THIS OBLIQUE
ANSWER IS PROBABLY AS MUCH AS WE CAN EXPECT TO GET.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES
N.EAST. DEPT.
NEWS DEPT.
P.S. TO MR. GODBER
SIR P. ADAMS
SIR W. LUCE

SECRET - GUARD

Received this morning from J. Embassy.

18/11

(21)

Mr ~~Makins~~ ^{Cont. 20} or.


Mr Evans R.E. 21/11

pm w
2x/4

Mr ~~Mear~~
News D.

✓W23/11

Jordan Embassy
6 Upper Phillimore Gardens
London W8 7HE



Press Release.

Certain reports have been circulating in the British Press and Television about alleged meetings which took place between His Majesty King Hussein and some Israeli officials. The Embassy would like to deny categorically these reports which are completely unfounded and no more than mere fabrications.

The Embassy of Jordan also wishes to deny other allegations which appeared in a recent book, regarding a request for foreign intervention in Jordan, which His Majesty is said to have made to the governments of the Western Powers through their Embassies in Amman. The Embassy would like to stress the fact that the only request that His Majesty did make during the recent conflict in Jordan last September, was to the Big Four Powers - the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and France - and it was to request them to co-operate fully to prevent any foreign intervention in Jordan.

Snow's
book.

R.E.
21/11

November 17, 1970

Middle East: A Secret Rendezvous

DUSK had just descended on the flat, lonely Arava wilderness north of Elath. In the two convoys of cars approached each other at a border point where Israel and Jordan meet. Prearranged signals were flashed, and the convoy from Jordan sped into Israel. Some of the Jordanians joined the Israeli convoy, which moved to a secluded spot. For 90 minutes, Jordan's King Hussein and Israel's Deputy Premier Yigal Allon carried on an undisturbed conversation in an air-conditioned car. Israeli security men maintained a lookout, and Israeli army units near by went on the alert, without being told why.

The meeting was the latest of ten or so that have been held since September 1968, when Hussein met Allon and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban in London. The King has conferred at least once during that period with Israel's Premier Golda Meir.

Stronger Throne. During the parley, Hussein and Allon conversed in Arabic and English. The opening topic was peace. In the past few weeks, Israel has held a cursory discussion with United Nations Mediator Gunnar Jarring. Allon asked the King whether Jordan might be interested in carrying on peace talks with Israel, either through Jarring or directly. Hussein acknowledged that conditions have changed since the death of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, and that his throne is stronger as a result of Jordan's civil war. But he held that the time was not ripe for unilateral discussions. Even so, one result of the border meeting is that broader negotiations with representatives of other Arab states can be expected to follow.

Turning to the question of the guerrillas, the two leaders agreed that the fedayeen were a nuisance to both coun-

tries and that coordination was necessary to neutralize them. The King received promises of Israeli help.

Hussein and Allon also agreed to expand economic relations. At the same time, however, Hussein protested that Mrs. Meir was undercutting him by observing during her latest U.S. visit that Palestinian statehood was only a question of redrawing Jordan's boundaries. The King was prepared to grant Palestinian autonomy of a sort, he said, but under his rule, and not as the nucleus of an independent Palestinian state.

Seeking the Mantle. On that note of amiability the meeting ended. Both sides kept the discussion secret, but Israel was particularly sensitive. Mrs. Meir's government has publicly insisted that it will not talk with the U.N.'s Jarring until Egypt removes its newly emplaced Soviet-built missiles from the Suez Canal Zone. Israel's Cabinet was startled, therefore, when an opposition member said in the Knesset last week that he had heard about the Hussein-Allon talks and demanded to know why Israel's parliament had not been briefed on them. His question was erased from parliamentary records, and censors refused to let newsmen report it.

There was speculation that the question had been planted by supporters of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. With key Labor Party elections set for mid-December, Dayan is locked in an increasingly bitter battle with Allon, Eban and Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir, the party's kingmaker, over who should be designated heir apparent to Mrs. Meir, 72. Dayan wants the mantle; so does Allon, an Oxford-educated Kibbutznik who was a military hero (in the 1948 War of Independence) before he shifted from the army to politics.



DEFENSE MINISTER DAYAN

Cross words over the Premier's phone.

To make himself more acceptable to party moderates and to demonstrate independence, Dayan is striving to change his hawkish image. In recent months, for example, he has proposed that both Israel and Egypt pull back 13 miles from their Suez Canal fortifications so that the canal can be reopened. Two weeks ago, at a Labor Party meeting in Haifa, Dayan also suggested that Israel reopen the Jarring talks in earnest. To end the Arab conflict, he said, "we must plunge into some very cold water, because we are not interested in continuing the war."

Furious, Mrs. Meir telephoned Dayan and reminded him that her government was still publicly opposed to talks because of Egyptian and Soviet missile movements near Suez, and that the U.S. was increasing its arms shipments to Israel to counterbalance those movements. In fact, both the U.S. and Israel have quietly decided that "rectification," or rollback, of the missiles is a dead issue. Even so, when Dayan told Golda that he had been misquoted, the Premier hung up on him.

After that conversation, articles critical of Dayan began to appear in major Israeli newspapers last week. They were almost certainly inspired by anti-Dayan leaders of the Labor Party. Dayan's enemies are not all congregated in the Labor hierarchy. Earlier, the magazine *Ha'olam Hazei* (This World) had published a highly suspicious story claiming to document an attempt to recruit the Defense Minister into the CIA in 1959, when he was a private citizen. The magazine reproduced a letter, purported to be from the Pentagon to a U.S. military attaché in Tel Aviv, which ordered him to arrange Dayan's enlistment with the local CIA station chief. In the same issue of *Ha'olam Hazei* was another story, which took laudatory note of Allon's "heavy work schedule."



ISRAELI HOST ALLON



JORDANIAN VISITOR HUSSEIN

Amiable exchange in an air-conditioned car.

application in 1963, setting back the rest of Europe's then bright dreams of eventual political federation.

Despite his conservative attitude toward the concept of Europe, De Gaulle pursued venturesome policies elsewhere. In 1964, France became the first Western power since the Korean War to extend recognition to Peking. He became the first Western statesman who actively sought to build ties with the East Bloc and to overcome the rigidities of the cold war. He proposed a gradual easing of tension by a process he described as *détente*, *entente*, *coopération*. He recognized the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border and urged Bonn to do the same. He also urged international acceptance of East Germany. The basic outlines of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* were traced several years earlier by De Gaulle. In the Middle East, De Gaulle dropped his support of Israel following the 1967 war. Then, after reprimanding the Jews as an "elite, domineering people," he made overtures to the Arabs that were intended, his apologists maintain, to retain Western influence in an area that had only Russia as an alternative.

Always, De Gaulle deported himself according to the stern precepts of leadership he laid down in 1934 in a small book called *The Edge of the Sword*. "Nothing demonstrates authority better than silence," he wrote. "There can be no prestige without mystery, for we have little reverence for that which we know too well." De Gaulle rarely granted private press interviews and seldom appeared in public. At his press conferences, held about every six months, 1,000 or so journalists would sit on frail gilded chairs in an ornate reception hall in the Elysée as De Gaulle answered the questions that suited him and invariably passed over the others.

His bulky form made him a tempting target for assassination, and the die-hard Secret Army Organization, which despised him for giving up Algeria, was gunning for him. In all, there were at least ten plots and two actual attempts to kill him. Once, on a road near Paris, his black presidential Citroën was riddled with bullets. But De Gaulle and his wife remained sitting erect in the back seat, refusing even to duck. After all, he once wrote: "Adversity attracts the man of character . . . He seeks out the bitter joy of responsibility."

If De Gaulle's speech was stately and oracular in public, it was often earthy in conversations with friends. Like Lenin, he seems to have com-

mented on everything and everybody. On John F. Kennedy: "[a President] with the style of a hairdresser's assistant—he combed his way through problems." On Jackie Kennedy, after John Kennedy's death: "She'll end up on an oilman's yacht." On Harry Truman: "a merchant." On Richard Nixon, 1963: "This man has a great future in store for him."

When De Gaulle was out of power, he liked to describe the continual shifts of Ministers in the Fourth Republic's Cabinets by saying, "*Chose, machin, chouette* [thingamabob, thingamajig, whosit] are being replaced by *chouette, machin, chose*." He often referred to members of the National Assembly as *pisse froid* or *pisse vinaigre*. In private,

certain of the army's support, finally rallied his country. After a ringing speech ("I shall not withdraw. I have a mandate from the people."), a million Frenchmen marched down the Champs-Élysées in support of De Gaulle.

The following year, De Gaulle chose to turn a referendum on the establishment of regional governments (a relatively popular issue) and the downgrading of the Senate (an unpopular one) into a vote of confidence on his presidency. As the returns showed that the trend was running irreversibly against him, De Gaulle sent a two-sentence message to Paris from Colombey: "I am ceasing to exercise my functions as President of the Republic. This decision takes effect at noon today."

FRANCE SOIR



DE GAULLE & WIFE AT DAUGHTER'S GRAVE (1969)
Restoration of pride.

he often called France "*vacharde*"—inert or uninspired. The fact was that France offered De Gaulle too limited a scope and power base. Try as he might, he could not change the basic reality that France simply lacked the specific gravity to offset the force of a superpower.

De Gaulle's narrow victory in the 1965 presidential election should have warned him that his popularity was not boundless. He shrugged off the growing disorders in early spring of 1968 to fly off for a chat with Rumania's Nicolae Ceausescu. While he was being feted in Bucharest, much of France erupted in chaos, as students battled police and striking workers seized plants. Shaken, De Gaulle returned and, after making

Though the dimensions of De Gaulle's place in French history are already evident, years must pass before a conclusion can be reached on such questions as whether Europe was actually better served by keeping Britain out in the cold a while longer. Harvard Political Scientist Stanley Hoffmann, for one, believes that if utopian federalists had managed to achieve some sort of European unity ten or 15 years ago, it would have been "a merger of confused peoples not knowing what they were doing. The kind of Western Europe that is emerging now is a very pragmatic Europe, cooperating step by step in areas where they are indeed highly interdependent. This is what De Gaulle had in mind." But others point out that De Gaulle's "no" killed a certain spirit, born of the war and the Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe, that provided a supranational impulse toward rapid federation.

Whatever the historical judgment on his leadership, De Gaulle demonstrated the importance of those great intangibles in the calculus of power—moral force, will, style, vision. To many men, these are only words; they were realities to De Gaulle, realities that the world often distrusts and yet yearns for more than ever today. These qualities, as much as any specific accomplishments, will make his figure endure, just as the memory of another great—and even more controversial—Frenchman has survived through the years. As a young man, Charles de Gaulle composed a tribute to Napoleon Bonaparte that could serve as his own epitaph: "In spite of the time that has gone by, of opposing sentiments and new subjects for mourning, crowds from every part of the world render homage to his memory and near his grave abandon themselves to a shiver of grandeur."


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British Embassy,

23

(2/41)



Sep 11/12 Tel Aviv
Mr. Weait: (News Dept)

11 December, 1970.

Watched for your views on the last sentence of para 2.

UPM 16/12

Mr. Pike again.

Letter to Tel Aviv.

P.A. 23/12

Dear Michael,

I enclose a translation of an article which appeared in yesterday's Ha'aretz from its London correspondent. As you will see it suggests that there has been a change in HMG's policy at the expense of King Hussein and with implications for Anglo-Israel relations.

2. The author of the article, Aleph Shem, is not very sympathetic to us at the best of times and we would hope that the story will not be taken too seriously here. But in view of Mr. Eban's visit next week, we thought that you should know about it. We should also be interested to know if News Department have any line on the matter.

(sent mdy) 3. Incidentally we have not yet received any record of King Hussein's talks in London, but assume that you will be sending us something.

Yours ever,

Nehor M.

(N. J. Mandel)

M. E. Pike, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

copied to: Chanceries at

Amman
Cairo
Tripoli

RESTRICTED



Translation

Ha'aretz (10 December)

"Heath is Cold to Hussein"

"The Future belongs to his
Opponents"

(From Aleph Shem the Ha'aretz correspondent
in Britain).

"London 9 December (special to Ha'aretz). It is reckoned here that King Hussein's visit to Britain was a political failure, but this for reasons which will perhaps not please Israel.

"Hussein's political objective was to regain his political credibility which has suffered badly from events [in Jordan in September], especially in the press and among official British circles which almost wrote Hussein off as a political force without a future. Hussein's attempts to convince the British Prime Minister, Mr. Heath, and Whitehall that he has re-established himself did not succeed at all. Whitehall kept a straight face.

"The writing off' of King Hussein flows from the new tendency to rely more on radical forces [in the Arab world], in the belief that they have a greater future and from the British desire to reduce areas of friction with Russia. The personal influence on Mr. Heath of Mr. Maitland (previously British Ambassador in Libya and a supporter of the new regime there) is felt in this development.

"The belief of going round Whitehall is that the Egyptian power plus Libyan and Iraqi oil are much greater in importance than traditional British debts, such as British support for the royal regime in Jordan, the fruit of an original British creation.

"One can expect this development to have implications for Anglo/Israel relations."

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Reference.....

DEJ 3/408/1

Lettr to Tel Aviv.

P.A.

23/12

(24)

Mr. Pike (Near Eastern Dept.)

Mr. Aleph Shem

I am afraid I do not know Mr. Shem. He does not keep in touch with News Department; if he did, his reports might (with luck) more closely approximate to the facts.

2. As you are aware, we try within the limits of the public interest to keep correspondents informed of developments in our thinking on foreign policy matters. As far as the Middle East is concerned, this does include the assertion that we wish to maintain and develop friendly relations with the "revolutionary" as well as the traditionally governed Arab states. (This has, as you know, been a cardinal point of our policy for many years.) But for Mr. Shem to suggest that, because of that, we have decided to write off King Hussein is a travesty. If he does contact me, I shall do all I can to put him right.

J. G. B. Weait

J. G. B. Weait
News Dept.
22 December 1970

RESTRICTED



Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

25

NEJ 3/408/1

23 December, 1970

pm
29/12

"Heath is Cold to Hussein"

(23)

Thank you for your letter (2/41) and enclosure of 11 December about the article in Ha'aretz by its London correspondent suggesting that H.M.G.'s policy has recently changed at the expense of King Hussein.

2. We have consulted News Department on this. They do not know Mr. Shem and have not yet taken any action in relation to his article (which is of course a travesty of the real position). They are however endeavouring to get in touch with him and will do their best to put him right.

3. You will, by now, have received the Record of Conversation between King Hussein and the Prime Minister on 4 December.

(M. E. Pike)

N. J. Mandel Esq.,
H.M. Embassy,
TelAviv.

copy to: Chancery at Amman.

26

IPHER CAT 'A'
PRIORITY TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1147

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
31 DECEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 311500Z

ADDRESSED FCO TEL NO 1147 OF 31/12 RPTD FOR INFO TO AMMAN,
BEIRUT, CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 1006: ⁽²⁸⁾ ISRAEL/JORDAN.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10 -1 JAN 1971 NES 3/408/1
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OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE FAIRLY RELAXED AND CONSCIOUS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT EMBARRASSING THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. MILITARY ATTACHE, WHEN HE MENTIONED THE BEIT SHEAN INCIDENT TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE YESTERDAY, WAS TOLD THAT THIS WAS REGARDED AS AN ISOLATED OCCURRENCE AND THE ISRAELIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE TAKING IT TOO SERIOUSLY.

2. AS YOU KNOW THERE HAVE BEEN PERSISTENT REPORTS LATELY THAT THE ISRAELIS AND JORDANIANS ARE IN TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER.

3. APART FROM THE REPORTS A MONTH OR SO AGO WHICH KING HUSSEIN VIRTUALLY CONFIRMED (AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 927), WE HAVE HEARD PRIVATELY THAT THE ISRAEL DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IS OUT OF THE COUNTRY, REPORTEDLY ON HOLIDAY, AND I WONDER IF THERE IS ANY CONNECTION WITH THE PRESS REPORT THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS BEEN IN A CLINIC IN LONDON. A CLINIC THERE IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN THE COVER FOR AN EARLIER MEETING WITH ALLON. THE PRESS HERE IS ALSO SPECULATING THAT GENERAL DAYAN MAY HAVE MET THE KING IN A 'WESTERN COUNTRY' DURING A RECENT REPORTED ABSENCE FROM THE COUNTRY.

4. IF THERE IS ANYTHING IN ALL THIS, IT SUGGESTS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE PLANNING ANYTHING WHICH COULD MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT WITH JORDAN. IF YOU FEEL IT NECESSARY TO SAY ANYTHING TO THE ISRAEL EMBASSY, YOU MAY WANT TO GO NO FURTHER THAN TO EMPHASISE OUR HOPE THAT RECENT ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE JARRING TALKS WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE UNIMPEDED PROGRESS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/5. AS

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

5. AS SEEN FROM HERE IT WOULD BE BETTER, HOWEVER, TO SAY NOTHING, ESPECIALLY WHEN ANYTHING WE MAY SAY MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS CONDONING FEDAYEEN ACTION. THIS IS ESPECIALLY THE CASE WHEN THE FEDAYEEN HAVE NOT HELPED MATTERS BY CLAIMING CREDIT FOR BLOWING UP THE ISRAEL MESS HALL SOUTH OF THE DEAD SEA YESTERDAY, WHEN A ROCK FALL KILLED TWENTY SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

MR. BARNES

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NET 3/408/1 SECRET

② P.O.S. Dept 18/12
(Mr. Brown)

Near Eastern Department

Philip Adams
R.E. 18/12
Mr. Laver
Mr. Evans
Mr. Mason
Mr. Pike 18/12
Enter
P.A. 18/12
15/1

In the course of a short conversation with Mr. Eban over a sandwich lunch at Chatham House, the name Zaid Rifai came up. Mr. Eban said at once that he knew him fairly well, having seen him at a number of "the meetings which never took place". He found him intelligent and interesting, but he had always rather wished that King Hussein would bring with him some more political character. The only other person whom King Hussein had once brought with him was "his uncle" which I took to mean Sharif Nasser, for Mr. Eban said that he assumed that he had been brought along because he owned the boat involved in the meeting which appeared ^{normally} ~~clearly~~ to be used for hashish smuggling.

2. I did not get the opportunity to pursue this line of conversation but it offers interesting corroboratory evidence of Israeli/Jordanian meetings and ^{indicates} that at least one of them took place, as we thought, at sea in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Philip Adams

(Philip Adams)
18 December, 1970.

SECRET

CYPHER CAT/A
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 1006

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TO F.C.O.
31 DECEMBER 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 9 - 1 JAN 1971
NET 3/408/1

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310900Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 1006 DATED 31 DECEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV BEIRUT CAIRO AND WASHINGTON. P.A. 15/1

PRINCE HASSAN, NO DOUBT WITH THE ISRAELI RAID INTO LEBANON ON
28 DECEMBER IN MIND, HAS EXPRESSED TO ME HIS FEAR THAT THE ISRAELIS
MAY SOON CARRY OUT ATTACKS ON JORDAN IN REPRISAL FOR FEDAYEEN
ACTIONS. HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR THE TWO ROCKETS, AUTOMATICALLY
LAUNCHED, WHICH HIT BEIT SHEAN ON 28 DECEMBER, AND ALSO SPOKE OF A
POSSIBLE ATTACK (OF WHICH HE HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED ADVANCE WARNING)
BY FEDAYEEN ON EILATH.

2. PRINCE HASSAN STRESSED THAT JORDANIAN FORCES COULD NOT FOR ALL
THEIR EFFORTS ALTOGETHER PREVENT FEDAYEEN ATTACKS FROM JORDANIAN
TERRITORY. THEY WERE NOW AT THE STAGE OF EXTINGUISHING THE LAST
SPARKS OF ORGANISED FEDAYEEN RESISTANCE IN JORDAN, AND REPRISALS
BY THE ISRAELIS COULD ONLY HAMPER THESE EFFORTS AND REKINDLE SOME
OF THE FORMER PUBLIC SYMPATHY FOR THE FEDAYEEN WHICH THEY WERE FAST
LOSING. HE HOPED THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS WOULD DO ALL WE COULD TO
URGE RESTRAINT ON THE ISRAELIS. I PROMISED TO PASS THIS ON TO YOU.

FCO PASS TO WASHINGTON

MR. PHILLIPS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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P.A.
15/1

6/1

TO PRIORITY TEL AVIV TELNO 603 OF 31 DEC INFO PRIORITY TO AMMAN
WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CAIRO AND BEIRUT

28

AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 1006 (WHICH WE ARE NOW REPEATING TO
UKMIS NEW YORK): JORDAN/ISRAEL.

(LAST PAPER)

IF YOU JUDGE THAT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL, PLEASE SPEAK TO THE
ISRAELIS IN THE WAY SUGGESTED.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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